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Lecture notes. Written from the material of Berkeley Stat 210A, licensed CC BY 4.0. These are notes, not a transcript: the material has been reorganised and rewritten. This adaptation carries the same licence, and the original is linked above.

31. Sufficiency and Minimal Sufficiency (part 1)

What this covers

This chapter asks what it means for a statistic — some function of the data — to summarize a sample without throwing away information about an unknown parameter. It defines sufficiency directly from conditional distributions, gives the standard tool for recognizing a sufficient statistic by inspecting a density (the factorization theorem), and then asks how far a sufficient statistic can be compressed, which leads to minimal sufficiency and a general recognition criterion built from the likelihood function (Bahadur's theorem). It assumes familiarity with densities with respect to a common dominating measure, conditional distributions, and order statistics.

A motivating example: three models for coin flipping

Consider data \(X_{i,j}\), for \(i = 1, \dots, 48\) and \(j = 1, \dots, n_i\), recording the outcome of flip \(j\) in group \(i\). Three nested models describe increasingly less restrictive versions of the same data:

  • Model 3. \(X_{i,j} \overset{\text{ind}}{\sim} \text{Bernoulli}(\theta_{i,j})\), with \(\theta_{i,j}\) decreasing in \(j\) within each group — a separate, monotone-in-\(j\) success probability for every group and every position.
  • Model 2. \(X_{i+} \overset{\text{ind}}{\sim} \text{Binomial}(n_i, \theta_i)\), where \(X_{i+} = \sum_{j=1}^{n_i} X_{i,j}\) — one probability per group.
  • Model 1. \(X_{++} \sim \text{Binomial}(n, \theta)\), where \(X_{++} = \sum_{i=1}^{48}\sum_{j=1}^{n_i} X_{i,j}\) and \(n = \sum_i n_i\) — a single probability for everything.

Model 1 makes the most assumptions (one shared \(\theta\)) and so is the most restrictive; Model 3 makes the fewest. The families of distributions are nested, \(\mathcal{P}_1 \subseteq \mathcal{P}_2 \subseteq \mathcal{P}_3\), because each more restrictive model is a special case of the next.

Notice that as the model gets more restrictive, the data needed to work with it shrinks: fitting Model 1 only requires the grand total \(X_{++}\); fitting Model 2 requires the vector of group totals \((X_{1+}, \dots, X_{48+})\). Are we losing anything by throwing away everything except these totals?

The answer is no: \(X_{++}\) is a sufficient statistic for \(\mathcal{P}_1\), and \((X_{1+}, \dots, X_{48+})\) is sufficient for \(\mathcal{P}_2\). The rest of this chapter makes that statement precise and shows how to check it.

Statistics and sufficiency

Definition. A statistic \(T(X)\) is any function of the data \(X\).

Definition. A statistic \(T(X)\) is sufficient for a model \(\mathcal{P} = \{P_\theta\}\) if the conditional distribution of \(X \mid T(X)\) is the same for every \(P_\theta \in \mathcal{P}\).

The point of the definition: if \(X \mid T(X)\) doesn't depend on \(\theta\), then once you know \(T(X)\), the rest of \(X\) contains no further evidence about \(\theta\) — you could simulate the remaining randomness yourself, without knowing \(\theta\), and it would look exactly like the real data.

Checking sufficiency directly: \(X_{++}\) in Model 1

Under \(\mathcal{P}_1\) the joint density of the full data \(x = (x_{ij})\) is

\[p_\theta(x) = \prod_{i=1}^{48}\prod_{j=1}^{n_i} \theta^{x_{ij}}(1-\theta)^{1-x_{ij}} = \theta^{X_{++}}(1-\theta)^{n-X_{++}}.\]

There is no binomial coefficient here — \(p_\theta(x)\) is the probability of one specific sequence of \(0\)s and \(1\)s, not the probability of a count. The coefficient \(\binom{n}{t}\) appears only when we compute the probability that the total equals \(t\), since \(\binom{n}{t}\) different sequences give that total:

\[P_\theta(X_{++} = t) = \binom{n}{t}\theta^t(1-\theta)^{n-t}.\]

Now compute the conditional distribution required by the definition:

\[P_\theta(X = x \mid X_{++} = t) = \frac{P_\theta(X=x,\, X_{++}=t)}{P_\theta(X_{++}=t)} = \frac{\mathbf{1}\{X_{++}=t\}\cdot \theta^t(1-\theta)^{n-t}}{\binom{n}{t}\theta^t(1-\theta)^{n-t}} = \frac{\mathbf{1}\{X_{++}=t\}}{\binom{n}{t}}.\]

The \(\theta\)s cancel completely: given the total \(t\), every sequence with that many \(1\)s is equally likely, and this does not depend on \(\theta\). So \(X_{++}\) is sufficient for \(\mathcal{P}_1\).

Intuition. Suppose you believe Model 1. A large or small total \(X_{++}\) is more or less likely depending on \(\theta\) — that is where the information about \(\theta\) lives. But once you are told \(X_{++} = 178{,}079\), every specific arrangement of that many heads among \(n\) flips is exactly as likely as any other, regardless of \(\theta\). There is nothing left in the arrangement that \(\theta\) could have produced.

This calculation used the exchangeability built into Model 1 (a single shared \(\theta\)) in an essential way. It is not true in Models 2 or 3: there \(\theta\) varies across groups (or across \(j\)), so which group contributed which \(1\)s is itself informative, and \(X_{++}\) is no longer sufficient once you drop down to those larger models.

The factorization theorem

Checking sufficiency from the definition means computing a conditional distribution, which is awkward. Usually a sufficient statistic can be spotted just by looking at the density.

Theorem (Factorization theorem). Let \(\mathcal{P} = \{P_\theta : \theta \in \Theta\}\) have densities \(p_\theta(x)\) with respect to a common measure \(\mu\). Then \(T(X)\) is sufficient for \(\mathcal{P}\) if and only if there exist functions \(g_\theta(t)\) and \(h(x) \ge 0\) such that

\[p_\theta(x) = g_\theta\big(T(x)\big)\, h(x) \qquad \text{for } \mu\text{-almost every } x.\]

Reading the statement. The factor \(h(x) \geq 0\) can be absorbed into the dominating measure: define \(\nu(A) = \int_A h(x)\, d\mu(x)\), and then \(\mathcal{P}\) has densities \(p_\theta(x) = g_\theta(T(x))\) with respect to \(\nu\). So, after the right change of base measure, the density depends on \(x\) only through \(T(x)\). The factor \(g_\theta(T(x))\) cannot similarly be absorbed, because it depends on \(\theta\).

Proof, discrete case. Take \(\mu\) to be counting measure, without loss of generality.

(\(\Leftarrow\)) Assume \(p_\theta(x) = g_\theta(T(x))h(x)\). Then

\[P_\theta(X=x \mid T(X)=t) = \frac{P_\theta(X=x,\,T(X)=t)}{P_\theta(T(X)=t)} = \frac{g_\theta(t)\,h(x)\,\mathbf{1}\{T(x)=t\}}{\sum_{z: T(z)=t} g_\theta(t)\,h(z)},\]

and \(g_\theta(t)\) cancels top and bottom, leaving something free of \(\theta\).

(\(\Rightarrow\)) Assume \(T(X)\) is sufficient. Define

\[g_\theta(t) = P_\theta(T(X)=t), \qquad h(x) = P(X=x \mid T(X)=T(x)),\]

where \(h\) does not depend on \(\theta\) because \(T(X)\) is sufficient. Then

\[g_\theta(T(x))\,h(x) = P_\theta\big(T(X)=T(x) \text{ and } X=x\big) = P_\theta(X=x) = p_\theta(x). \qquad \blacksquare\]

The proof for general (non-discrete) sample spaces is similar, with more care needed about what conditioning on \(T(X)=t\) means in continuous spaces.

Examples

Normal location family. Let \(X_1,\dots,X_n \overset{\text{iid}}{\sim} N(\theta,1)\). Then

\[p_\theta(x) = (2\pi)^{-n/2}\prod_{i=1}^n e^{-(x_i-\theta)^2/2} = e^{\theta \sum x_i - n\theta^2/2}\cdot \frac{e^{-\sum x_i^2/2}}{(2\pi)^{n/2}}.\]

Collecting every factor that does not involve \(\theta\) into \(h(x)\) and everything else into \(g_\theta(T(x))\) with \(T(x) = \sum x_i\) shows \(\sum X_i\) is sufficient.

Poisson family. Let \(X_1,\dots,X_n \overset{\text{iid}}{\sim} \text{Pois}(\theta)\). Then

\[p_\theta(x) = \prod_{i=1}^n \frac{\theta^{x_i}e^{-\theta}}{x_i!} = \theta^{\sum x_i}e^{-n\theta}\cdot \frac{1}{\prod x_i!},\]

so again \(T(x) = \sum x_i\) is sufficient. (These two examples share a structural feature relevant to the next topic, exponential families — not developed in this chapter.)

Uniform location family. Let \(X_1,\dots,X_n \overset{\text{iid}}{\sim} U[\theta,\theta+1]\). Then

\[p_\theta(x) = \prod_{i=1}^n \mathbf{1}\{\theta \le x_i \le \theta+1\} = \mathbf{1}\{\theta \le X_{(1)}\}\cdot \mathbf{1}\{X_{(n)} \le \theta+1\},\]

so the pair \((X_{(1)}, X_{(n)})\) — the smallest and largest observations — is sufficient. Here \(T\) does not reduce to a single number, and there is no way to factor \(h(x)\) so as to depend on fewer than both extremes.

What sufficiency buys you

\(X\) carries information about \(\theta\) only because its distribution depends on \(\theta\). The factorization theorem suggests thinking of the data as generated in two stages: first \(T(X)\) is drawn, from a distribution that depends on \(\theta\); then \(X\) is drawn from \(P(X \mid T(X))\), which does not depend on \(\theta\) at all.

θ T(X) X surrogate X̃ law of T(X) depends on θ P(X | T), free of θ just as good as X
Once T(X) is drawn, generating the rest of X — or a fresh surrogate from the same conditional law — adds no further information about θ.

This gives the sufficiency principle: if \(T(X)\) is sufficient for \(\mathcal{P}\), any statistical procedure should depend on the data only through \(T(X)\). In fact, since the second stage doesn't involve \(\theta\), you could throw away \(X\) entirely and generate a fresh \(\tilde{X} \sim P(X \mid T(X))\) — this \(\tilde X\) has exactly the same marginal distribution \(P_\theta\) as the real data, so it is just as good as \(X\) for any purpose that depends on \(\theta\).

Two more sufficient statistics for iid samples

Order statistics. For \(x_1,\dots,x_n \in \mathbb{R}\), the order statistics are \(X_{(1)} \le X_{(2)} \le \dots \le X_{(n)}\), the values sorted from smallest to largest. If \(X_1,\dots,X_n \overset{\text{iid}}{\sim} P_\theta\) for any model \(\mathcal{P} = \{P_\theta^n\}\) on \(\mathcal{X}\subseteq\mathbb{R}\), then \(P_\theta^n\) is invariant under permutations of \(X\), so every reordering of a given data set is exactly as likely as any other — meaning the order statistics \(S(X) = (X_{(i)})_{i=1}^n\) are sufficient. Passing from \(X\) to \(S(X)\) forgets only the original order in which the observations arrived.

Empirical distribution. Order statistics rely on a total ordering of \(\mathcal{X}\); for a general sample space, the analogous object is the empirical distribution. Writing \(\delta_x(A) = \mathbf{1}\{x \in A\}\) for the Dirac measure at \(x\), define

\[\hat P_n(\cdot) = \frac{1}{n}\sum_{i=1}^n \delta_{X_i}(\cdot),\]

a random measure on \(\mathcal{X}\) recording which values were observed and how many times. For iid sampling from any model on any sample space \(\mathcal{X}\), \(\hat P_n\) is sufficient.

Minimal sufficiency

A model typically has many sufficient statistics, of very different sizes. For \(X_1,\dots,X_n \overset{\text{iid}}{\sim} N(\theta,1)\), all of the following are sufficient:

\[X = (X_1,\dots,X_n), \qquad S(X) = (X_{(1)},\dots,X_{(n)}), \qquad \textstyle\sum_i X_i, \qquad \bar X = \tfrac1n\sum_i X_i.\]

Some of these can be recovered from others: \(X\) determines \(S(X)\) (and no less), \(S(X)\) determines \(\sum X_i\) (and no less), while \(\sum X_i\) and \(\bar X\) determine each other exactly.

X S(X) Σ Xᵢ X̄ can compress further can compress further most compressed
Each arrow points from a statistic to a coarser one it determines; Σ Xᵢ and X̄ determine each other, and both turn out to be minimal sufficient for the normal location family.

The natural question: are \(\sum X_i\) and \(\bar X\) as compressed as a sufficient statistic can be?

Proposition. If \(T(X)\) is sufficient and \(T(X) = f(S(X))\) for some function \(f\), then \(S(X)\) is also sufficient.

Proof. By the factorization theorem, \(p_\theta(x) = g_\theta(T(x))h(x) = (g_\theta \circ f)\big(S(x)\big)\,h(x)\), which is again a factorization through \(S(x)\). \(\blacksquare\)

This says compressing further than a sufficient statistic (through some \(f\)) keeps you sufficient — sufficiency only gets easier to maintain as you keep less. It motivates:

Definition. \(T(X)\) is minimal sufficient if

  1. \(T(X)\) is sufficient, and
  2. for every other sufficient statistic \(S(X)\), there is a function \(f\) with \(T(X) = f(S(X))\) almost surely under \(\mathcal{P}\).

However many further sufficient statistics you add to the diagram above, all their arrows point into \(\sum X_i\) (equivalently \(\bar X\)): it sits at the bottom of the hierarchy.

Recognizing minimal sufficiency: Bahadur's theorem

Checking minimality against every sufficient statistic directly from the definition is not practical. There is a cleaner criterion, built from an equivalence relation on the sample space.

Assume \(\mathcal{P}\) has densities \(p_\theta\) on sample space \(\mathcal{X}\), and define

\[x \equiv_{\mathcal{P}} y \quad \text{if} \quad \frac{p_\theta(x)}{p_\theta(y)} \text{ does not depend on } \theta.\]

Any sufficient statistic can only merge equivalent points. If \(T(x) = T(y) = t\) for a sufficient \(T\), then

\[\frac{p_\theta(x)}{p_\theta(y)} = \frac{P_\theta(X=x,\,T(X)=t)}{P_\theta(X=y,\,T(X)=t)} = \frac{P(X=x\mid T(X)=t)}{P(X=y\mid T(X)=t)},\]

and the right-hand side does not depend on \(\theta\) because \(T\) is sufficient. So \(T(x)=T(y) \implies x \equiv_{\mathcal{P}} y\) for any sufficient \(T\) — sufficiency can never separate two values that are \(\equiv_{\mathcal{P}}\)-equivalent.

Theorem (Bahadur). If \(T(X)\) satisfies the converse as well —

\[x \equiv_{\mathcal{P}} y \iff T(x) = T(y),\]

— then \(T(X)\) is minimal sufficient. In words: a minimal sufficient statistic collapses the sample space into exactly the \(\equiv_{\mathcal{P}}\) equivalence classes, no more and no less.

Proof sketch. First, \(T(X)\) is sufficient: for \(x\) with \(T(x)=t\),

\[P_\theta(X=x\mid T(X)=t) = \frac{p_\theta(x)}{\sum_{z:T(z)=t}p_\theta(z)} = \frac{1}{\sum_{z:T(z)=t} p_\theta(z)/p_\theta(x)},\]

and this does not depend on \(\theta\), because every \(z\) with \(T(z)=t=T(x)\) satisfies \(z \equiv_{\mathcal{P}} x\), so each ratio \(p_\theta(z)/p_\theta(x)\) is free of \(\theta\).

Now let \(S(X)\) be any other sufficient statistic. If \(S(x)=S(y)=s\), then (by the merging fact above) \(x \equiv_{\mathcal{P}} y\), so \(T(x)=T(y)\); define \(f(s)\) to be this common value. Any other \(z\) with \(S(z)=s\) has \(z \equiv_{\mathcal{P}} x\) (again because \(S\) is sufficient), hence \(T(z) = T(x) = f(s) = f(S(z))\). So \(T(X) = f(S(X))\) for every sufficient \(S\), which is exactly minimality. \(\blacksquare\)

The likelihood function

For \(\mathcal{P} = \{P_\theta\}\) with densities \(p_\theta(x)\), the likelihood function is

\[\text{Lik}(\theta; X) = p_\theta(X),\]

viewed as a function of \(\theta\) for the observed (random) \(X\) — the data pick out which function of \(\theta\) you are looking at. The log-likelihood is \(\ell(\theta;X) = \log\text{Lik}(\theta;X)\).

Since \(\ell(\theta;x) - \ell(\theta;y) = \log\big(p_\theta(x)/p_\theta(y)\big)\), the equivalence \(x \equiv_{\mathcal{P}} y\) says exactly that the log-likelihood difference between \(x\) and \(y\) does not depend on \(\theta\) — the two likelihood functions differ only by an additive constant. Bahadur's theorem can be restated: a minimal sufficient statistic is exactly one whose value tells you the shape of the log-likelihood function up to an additive constant, and nothing more.

Example: the Laplace location family

Let \(X_1,\dots,X_n \overset{\text{iid}}{\sim} p_\theta^{(1)}(x) = \tfrac12 e^{-|x-\theta|}\). Then

\[\ell(\theta;x) = -\sum_{i=1}^n |x_i - \theta| - n\log 2.\]

As a function of \(\theta\), this is piecewise linear with kinks exactly at the order statistics \(x_{(i)}\). On the interval \([x_{(k)}, x_{(k+1)}]\) the slope is \(n - 2k\): each of the \(k\) observations below \(\theta\) contributes slope \(-1\) (from \(-|x_i - \theta|\)), each of the \(n-k\) above contributes \(+1\).

A piecewise-linear function is determined, up to an additive constant, entirely by the slopes on each piece and where the kinks are — and here the slopes on \([x_{(k)},x_{(k+1)}]\) depend only on \(k\), not on the values themselves. So

\[\ell(\theta;x) = \ell(\theta;y) + \text{const} \iff x \text{ and } y \text{ have the same order statistics},\]

i.e., \(x \equiv_{\mathcal{P}} y\) iff \(x\) and \(y\) have the same order statistics. By Bahadur's theorem, the order statistics are minimal sufficient for the Laplace location family.

Sources

  • Berkeley STAT210A, lecture 4 ("Sufficiency"), handwritten notes. Three parallel course offerings cover the same lecture — fall-2024, fall-2025, fall-2026, each converted from handwritten/lecture04-sufficiency.pdf (a PDF with no text layer, reconstructed by a model; every equation is flagged unverified in the source conversions).
  • The coin-flipping motivating example, the definitions of statistic and sufficiency, the direct check of sufficiency for \(X_{++}\), the factorization theorem (statement and proof), and the normal/Poisson/uniform examples are common to all three years' 01-sufficiency.md/02-factorization-theorem.md (and 03-examples.md for fall-2025/2026).
  • The fall-2025 and fall-2026 03-examples.md files repeat the same three examples and then break off partway into "Interpretations of Sufficiency."
  • The fall-2024 notes carry the lecture further and are the sole basis for everything past the factorization-theorem examples: the two-stage generative picture and sufficiency principle, order statistics, the empirical distribution, and the minimal-sufficiency compression hierarchy for the normal location family (all in fall-2024's 02-factorization-theorem.md), plus the equivalence-relation criterion, Bahadur's theorem, the likelihood function, and the Laplace-family example (fall-2024's 03-recognizing-minimal-sufficiency.md).
  • The lecture notes flag, but do not develop, a connection between the normal and Poisson sufficient-statistic examples "for next lecture" — that connection (exponential families) is not part of this chapter.
  • No slides, transcript, or exercises were supplied for this lecture.

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