Lecture notes. Written from the material of Berkeley Stat 210A, licensed CC BY 4.0. These are notes, not a transcript: the material has been reorganised and rewritten. This adaptation carries the same licence, and the original is linked above.
43. Minimax Estimation (part 1)¶
What this covers¶
An estimator can be judged by its risk against one adversarially chosen parameter value rather than by an average risk under a prior. This chapter defines that criterion — minimax risk — and develops the main tool for finding or certifying a minimax estimator: a least favorable prior, which turns nature's adversarial choice of \(\theta\) into a specific randomized strategy against which Bayes and minimax analysis coincide. It assumes the decision-theoretic setup of earlier lectures: a risk function \(R(\theta;\delta)\) for an estimator \(\delta\), and Bayes risk and Bayes estimators relative to a prior.
Minimax risk¶
The worst-case criterion asks for an estimator that minimizes the risk at the single most unfavorable parameter value:
The best achievable value of this worst-case risk is the minimax risk of the problem,
and an estimator \(\delta^*\) achieving it, \(\sup_\theta R(\theta;\delta^*) = r^*\), is called minimax.
This has a game-theoretic reading: the analyst picks \(\delta\), and then nature picks \(\theta\) to maximize the resulting risk. The important point is what nature is choosing — nature picks the parameter \(\theta\) adversarially, not the data \(X\); the randomness in \(X\mid\theta\) is still whatever the model says it is. Compare this with the Bayes setup, where nature's move is constrained in advance to a known distribution: nature is playing a fixed mixed strategy (the prior) rather than an arbitrary one. This suggests looking for the mixed strategy for nature that is optimal in a game-theoretic sense — a Nash equilibrium strategy — and that strategy is exactly what a least favorable prior turns out to be.
Least favorable priors¶
The link between minimax and Bayes analysis rests on one observation: average-case risk is at most worst-case risk. For any prior \(\Lambda\) (proper, for now) and any estimator \(\delta\),
Taking the infimum over \(\delta\) on both sides,
If \(\delta_\Lambda\) is a Bayes estimator for \(\Lambda\), the infimum on the left is attained, so \(r_\Lambda = \int R(\theta;\delta_\Lambda)\,d\Lambda(\theta)\). Hence the Bayes risk of any Bayes estimator, for any prior, is a lower bound on the minimax risk \(r^*\).
Since there is a lower bound for every prior, it is natural to ask which prior gives the best one. A least favorable prior \(\Lambda^*\) is one attaining
Symmetrically, the worst-case risk of any estimator is an upper bound on \(r^*\). Putting the two bounds together:
for an arbitrary estimator \(\delta\) on the left and an arbitrary prior \(\Lambda\) on the right. The strategy for exhibiting a minimax estimator and a least favorable prior simultaneously is to find a \(\delta\) and a \(\Lambda\) that collapse this whole chain to equality.
The theorem: when a Bayes estimator is minimax¶
Theorem. Suppose \(\delta_\Lambda\) is Bayes for a prior \(\Lambda\) and \(r_\Lambda = \sup_\theta R(\theta;\delta_\Lambda)\) — that is, the average risk of \(\delta_\Lambda\) under \(\Lambda\) equals its worst-case risk. Then:
(a) \(\delta_\Lambda\) is minimax;
(b) if \(\delta_\Lambda\) is the unique Bayes estimator for \(\Lambda\) (up to a.s. equality), it is the unique minimax estimator;
(c) \(\Lambda\) is a least favorable prior.
Proof.
(a) Let \(\tilde\delta\) be any other estimator. Then
where the middle inequality holds because \(\delta_\Lambda\) is Bayes for \(\Lambda\) (it minimizes Bayes risk), and the last equality is the hypothesis. So every estimator's worst-case risk is at least \(\sup_\theta R(\theta;\delta_\Lambda)\), which means \(\delta_\Lambda\) itself achieves the minimax risk.
(b) If \(\delta_\Lambda\) is the unique Bayes estimator, the middle inequality above is strict for any \(\tilde\delta \ne \delta_\Lambda\), so \(\sup_\theta R(\theta;\tilde\delta) > \sup_\theta R(\theta;\delta_\Lambda)\) for every competitor: \(\delta_\Lambda\) is the unique minimizer of the worst-case risk.
(c) Let \(\tilde\Lambda\) be any other prior. Then
No prior gives a larger Bayes-risk lower bound than \(\Lambda\) does, so \(\Lambda\) is least favorable. \(\blacksquare\)
A checkable condition — and a mistake to avoid¶
The theorem turns the hunt for a minimax estimator into a checkable condition: does the average risk of a Bayes estimator equal its worst-case risk?
One way this is guaranteed is if the risk function is constant:
- \(R(\theta;\delta_\Lambda)\) does not depend on \(\theta\) at all (an "equalizer rule"), or, more generally,
- \(\Lambda\) places all of its mass on the set where \(R(\theta;\delta_\Lambda)\) attains its maximum: \(\Lambda(\{\theta : R(\theta;\delta_\Lambda) = \max_\zeta R(\zeta;\delta_\Lambda)\}) = 1\).
Condition 2 is strictly weaker than condition 1: the risk function need not be flat everywhere, it only has to sit at its peak value everywhere the prior actually puts mass. Outside the support of \(\Lambda\) the risk is free to dip, since the average under \(\Lambda\) never sees that dip.
The lecture flagged a specific mistake on an exam: writing that "\(r_\Lambda\) is constant" proves nothing. \(r_\Lambda\) is already a single number — a constant by definition, since it is an average over \(\theta\) — so the phrase doesn't assert anything. The condition that actually does the work is that the risk function \(\theta \mapsto R(\theta;\delta_\Lambda)\) is constant (or constant on \(\operatorname{supp}(\Lambda)\)), which is a statement about a function of \(\theta\), not about the single number \(r_\Lambda\).
Worked example: a binomial proportion¶
Let \(X \sim \mathrm{Binom}(n,\theta)\) and estimate \(\theta\) under squared error loss. Try a \(\mathrm{Beta}(\alpha,\beta)\) prior, hoping to land on one that makes the risk of the resulting Bayes estimator constant in \(\theta\). The Bayes estimator (posterior mean) is
Its risk splits into variance plus squared bias:
Killing the \(\theta^2\) and \(\theta\) coefficients makes the risk constant in \(\theta\), which is exactly condition 1 above. Setting \((\alpha+\beta)^2 = n\) and \(2\alpha(\alpha+\beta) = n\) gives \(\alpha+\beta = \sqrt n\) and then \(2\alpha\sqrt n = n\), so
So \(\mathrm{Beta}\!\left(\tfrac{\sqrt n}{2}, \tfrac{\sqrt n}{2}\right)\) is least favorable, and by the theorem the corresponding Bayes estimator
is minimax. Two things are worth noting about how this worked. First, two equations (\(\theta^2\)-coefficient and \(\theta\)-coefficient both zero) had to be satisfied by two unknowns \(\alpha,\beta\), and they happened to be consistent — that is not guaranteed in general, and this example is a case of getting lucky rather than a template that always closes. Second, the resulting least favorable prior puts more and more of its mass near \(\theta = 1/2\) as \(n\) grows (a symmetric Beta with both parameters equal to \(\sqrt n / 2\) concentrates there): the lecture left open, as a question rather than a resolved point, why the hardest case for estimating a binomial proportion should concentrate so much weight at \(\theta = 1/2\).
When there is no least favorable prior: sequences¶
A least favorable prior need not exist. If the parameter space isn't compact, the prior that "should" make nature's move hardest may need to spread mass everywhere, which is not a proper distribution. For \(X \sim N(\theta,1)\) with \(\theta \in \mathbb{R}\), the natural candidate is a flat prior over the whole real line — not a proper prior at all.
The fix is to work with a sequence of priors instead of a single one. A sequence \(\Lambda_1,\Lambda_2,\dots\) is least favorable if
Theorem. Suppose \(\Lambda_1,\Lambda_2,\dots\) is a sequence of priors and \(\delta\) satisfies
Then (a) \(\delta\) is minimax, and (b) \(\Lambda_1,\Lambda_2,\dots\) is a least favorable sequence.
Proof.
(a) Let \(\tilde\delta\) be any other estimator. For every \(n\),
so
Since \(\tilde\delta\) was arbitrary, \(\delta\) achieves the minimax risk.
(b) For any prior \(\Lambda\),
So no prior's Bayes risk exceeds \(\lim_n r_{\Lambda_n}\), which is therefore \(\sup_\Lambda r_\Lambda\), and it is approached along the sequence by construction. \(\blacksquare\)
Putting the proper-prior and sequence versions together gives the general picture: for a generic estimator \(\delta\) and generic prior \(\Lambda\),
where the middle term equals \(\sup_\theta R(\theta;\delta^*)\) if a minimax estimator \(\delta^*\) exists, and the third term equals \(r_{\Lambda^*}\) if a least favorable prior \(\Lambda^*\) exists — but neither has to.
Bounding minimax risk¶
Actually finding a minimax estimator is hard in most problems. In practice, minimax bounds are the workhorse, used to characterize how hard an estimation problem is, especially from below:
- Upper bound: for any estimator \(\delta\), \(r^* \le \sup_\theta R(\theta;\delta)\) (with equality iff \(\delta\) is minimax).
- Lower bound: for any prior \(\Lambda\), \(r^* \ge \int R(\theta;\delta_\Lambda)\,d\Lambda(\theta)\) (with equality iff \(\Lambda\) is least favorable).
Two typical uses of this pair of bounds:
- Propose a practical estimator \(\delta\), then find a prior \(\Lambda\) whose Bayes risk is close to \(\sup_\theta R(\theta;\delta)\) — exactly, at the same rate, or asymptotically. This lets you conclude \(\delta\) cannot be improved by much, without ever exhibiting the exact minimax estimator.
- Quantify the intrinsic difficulty of an estimation problem via its minimax rate in some asymptotic regime, again without pinning down the exact minimax risk or estimator.
Caveat. A minimax bound is set by the single worst \(\theta\). A problem can be easy throughout most of the parameter space and only pathologically hard in some corner that is never encountered in practice — so a large minimax risk does not by itself mean the problem is hard everywhere.
Sources¶
All from Berkeley STAT 210A, handwritten lecture notes for lecture 12 (the notes themselves are
dated 10/5/2021, filed under the fall-2024 course directory as lecture12-F24), converted from a
scanned PDF with no text layer — the conversion is model-reconstructed and flagged
fidelity: reconstructed, so equations here should be checked against the original scan before
being cited further:
01-minimax-estimation.md— minimax risk, the game-theoretic reading, the average-vs-worst-case observation, and the inequality chain defining a least favorable prior.02-theorem.md— the theorem that a Bayes estimator with worst-case risk equal to its Bayes risk is minimax (and the prior least favorable), its proof, the checkable condition (constant risk / prior supported on the risk-maximizing set), and the exam-mistake remark.03-example-binomial.md— the worked binomial example with \(\mathrm{Beta}(\alpha,\beta)\) priors.04-least-favorable-sequence.md— least favorable sequences for non-compact parameter spaces, the corresponding theorem and proof, the general inequality picture, and the discussion of minimax bounds and their caveat.
No slides, transcript, or exercise set were supplied for this lecture. The lecture posed but did not answer the question of why the least favorable binomial prior concentrates near \(\theta=1/2\); that is left open here as it was left open in the source.
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